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Abstract
Many economists and policy-makers argue that households do not save enough
to maintain an adequate standard of living during retirement. However, there is
no consensus on the answer to the underlying question what this standard should
be, despite the fact that it is crucial for the design of saving incentives and pension
reforms. We address this question with a randomized survey design, individually
tailored to each respondent’s financial situation, and conducted both in the U.S.
and the Netherlands. Key findings are that adequate levels of retirement spending
exceed 80 percent of working life spending for a majority of respondents, minimum
acceptable replacement rates depend strongly on income, and households in the
Netherlands are much more risk averse than U.S. households.
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1 Introduction
What level of spending during retirement do people consider desirable, given their lifetime
budget constraints? How does this level compare to spending during working life? Is there
a minimum level of retirement spending which people want to maintain at all costs? How
much risk are individuals ready to bear in exchange for a higher expected standard of
living during retirement?
The answers to these questions provide a sound benchmark level for an adequate
standard of living during retirement and are thus important for three policy issues. First,
such a benchmark level allows us to address a concern expressed by many economists and
policy-makers: whether people are adequately prepared for retirement.1 Second, such a
benchmark may serve as advice to individuals who find determining an adequate level of
retirement savings themselves difficult. Third, such a benchmark is highly informative for
the many countries around the globe that are currently considering reforming their pension
systems, since any pension reform plan requires information about adequate benefit levels.
Several approaches for addressing the opening questions of this paper already exist.
One approach is to assume that a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility func-
tion can approximate individuals’ preferences. Making specific assumptions about the
parameters of this function as well as about other relevant variables such as interest rates
and equity returns allows for calibrating optimal consumption choices during old age and
during working life. According to this approach, which we dub the calibration approach,
actual observed choices are considered adequate if they come sufficiently close to these
calibrated choices.2 A second approach to operationalizing the notion of an adequate
level of retirement spending is to refer to certain benchmark replacement rates relating
to either income or spending. Third, one may refer to poverty thresholds.
None of these approaches is without problems. Any a priori chosen benchmark for
1See Bernheim (1992), Bernheim et al. (2000), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007), Munnell et al. (2006),
Skinner (2007), and Thaler (1994).
2See Scholz et al. (2006) for an impressive application of this methodology.
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a replacement rate, such as 70 or 80 percent, is somewhat ad hoc. Concerning poverty
thresholds, there are several different concepts of these thresholds, and the exact defi-
nition of the poverty line is necessarily somewhat arbitrary. While of obvious interest
to economists, the preference-based calibration approach depends crucially on assump-
tions about the functional form of preferences and the values of preference parameters,
for instance relative risk aversion. As pointed out by Poterba et al. (2003), “within the
framework of parametric CRRA utility functions, there is little consensus on the ‘correct’
value of the relative risk aversion coefficient” (p. 26). This holds also with respect to
other parameters.
It may seem that this problem of the calibration approach could be avoided by a
revealed preference approach. This would entail an econometric analysis of individuals’
observed retirement preparation choices which, in turn, would allow for inference of their
preferences. However, an inherent problem with this procedure is that people’s actual
retirement preparation choices may not be in their best self-interest. This may be due
to the fact that individuals simply adopt defaults (Beshears et al., 2006; Madrian and
Shea, 2001), lack important information about the availability and characteristics of re-
tirement accounts (Duflo and Saez, 2002, 2003; Duflo et al., 2006; Saez, forthcoming),
lack the willpower to save sufficiently (Thaler, 1994), or lack financial literacy (Lusardi
and Mitchell, 2007; van Rooij et al., 2007a).3 In fact, as is demonstrated by Skinner
(2007), the determination of an appropriate savings plan that implements a given life
cycle consumption profile is highly complex, and inferring individuals’ true preferences
from their observed retirement preparation choices might be inappropriate. Furthermore,
inferring people’s true preferences from their actual choices would be difficult, even in the
absence of this concern, since the actual choices may be constrained by the presence of a
mandatory pension system.4
3See Beshears et al. (2008) for a more complete discussion.
4This is a particular concern for many European countries whose pension systems offer relatively high
replacement rates (see OECD, 2007).
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The aim of this paper is to investigate preferences over retirement spending profiles by
using a different method. The novel approach we pursue here is to address the opening
questions of this paper by means of a specifically designed internet survey module which
we conduct with the American Life Panel (ALP) at RAND in the U.S., and with the
CentERpanel (CP) in the Netherlands. The U.S. embodies a country where individuals
bear a substantial amount of responsibility for their own retirement preparation, while
the Netherlands are a country with a typical European-style welfare state and a pension
system that offers generous replacement rates.5 In particular, the after-tax income re-
placement rate for an average earner amounts to about 85 percent in the Netherlands.
In contrast, it amounts to only about 50 percent in the U.S. (OECD, 2007). Our paper
therefore also sheds light on the question whether notions of an adequate standard of
living during retirement differ across such contrasting institutional setups, and if so to
what degree.
Two features of our approach to elicit preferences over retirement spending profiles
stand out. First, we tailor the survey questions individually to each respondent’s financial
situation, based on prior information about variables such as total household income.
This reduces the cognitive load and makes the questions meaningful in the context of
the respondent’s personal situation. Second, none of our questions requires respondents
to understand any technical aspects of retirement preparation, such as the concept of
compound interest or inflation.
We go to great length to make all our survey questions as simple and as meaningful
to respondents as possible, and we test formally whether respondents have understood
the questions. More specifically, three types of observations provide evidence that respon-
dents have understood the questions and that our survey indeed yields useful information
about people’s life cycle preferences: (i) We include various randomization treatments
and find that they do not affect response behavior in any way; (ii), there are meaningful
5See Gruber and Wise (1999, 2004) for a comprehensive overview of pension systems around the world.
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relationships between respondents’ choices and socioeconomic variables, and (iii), further
evidence comes from responses to feedback questions which we ask at the end of the
survey.
Clearly, in addition to the assumption that individuals understand our questions, our
survey approach also depends on the standard assumption that individuals do, in fact,
have well-defined preferences over spending profiles which they express truthfully in the
survey. However, our approach neither requires specific assumptions about the form nor
about the parametrization of the preference functional. Furthermore, as we will discuss
in more detail later, our approach neither depends on the assumption that individuals be
financially literate nor that they be able to make utility maximizing choices.
Overall, our study presents a novel way to elicit policy-relevant preference information
that is based on individually tailored and randomized surveys. Most importantly, we com-
plement existing studies depending on the calibration approach and thereby contribute
to the ongoing discussion about what an adequate standard of living during retirement
should be. Our findings are as follows. First, neglecting any risk associated with retire-
ment spending, we find that ex-ante desirable ratios of old age to working-life spending
are surprisingly high; they exceed 80 percent for a majority of respondents in both the
U.S. and the Netherlands. Second, we investigate the lower limits on old age spending
below which individuals would not want to fall in any case, and we estimate minimum
income replacement rates for each income quintile. For the U.S., these minimum replace-
ment rates amount to about 100 percent for respondents in the lowest income quintile
and gradually decrease to about 50 percent for respondents in the top income quintile. In
the Netherlands, this gradient is much weaker and minimum replacement rates decrease
from 70 percent for the first quintile to 60 percent for the fifth income quintile. Third, our
results show that risk aversion, elicited within a retirement preparation context, is much
higher in the Netherlands than in the U.S., and researchers need to take a high degree of
individual heterogeneity with respect to the risk aversion parameter into account.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the related
literature. Section 3 provides information about our samples. Section 4 presents our
results on ex-ante adequate old age spending in the absence of risk. Section 5 brings risk
into play. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The question whether individuals do adequately prepare for retirement has been addressed
by various studies depending on different methodological approaches. Banks et al. (1998)
use British data to analyze the behavior of expenditures around retirement and provide
evidence that there is a discrete drop in expenditures. This may reflect that individuals
do not adequately prepare for retirement but could also be explained by other factors
such as a systematic arrival of unexpected negative information around retirement.
Banks et al. (2005) analyze which groups of the population in England are at risk
of having inadequately low retirement savings for various adequacy benchmarks. These
benchmarks are either absolute benchmark levels or benchmark income replacement rates.
The authors find that a non-negligible fraction of the population is at risk of an inade-
quately low standard of living during retirement, depending on the measure of adequacy.
Scholz et al. (2006) address the question whether people adequately prepare for re-
tirement using data from the U.S. Health and Retirement Study. Their analysis is based
on the assumption that individuals have constant relative risk aversion preferences. The
surprising finding is that many people appear to save optimally or to even over-save. Over-
all, the divergent conclusions from existing studies underline the importance of further
exploring what constitutes an adequate standard of living during retirement.
In addition to the literature on adequate retirement preparation discussed above, there
is also a literature that is related to our work by its focus on using surveys to elicit
preferences. One study that has also used the Dutch CP is van Rooij et al. (2007b).
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This study investigates whether respondents prefer a mandatory pension system over a
privatized one with a free choice of contribution rates and asset allocation strategies.
Furthermore, it explores whether respondents show a preference for a defined benefit
system with income guarantees over a defined contribution system. The main difference
to our study is that we examine various aspects of individual preferences over standards
of living rather than preferences over features of pension design.
Seminal survey studies of preference elicitation in the domain of intertemporal choice
and choice under risk are Barsky et al. (1997), Donkers et al. (2001), Kapteyn and
Teppa (2003), Dohmen et al. (2005) and Kimball et al. (2006). Our analysis also differs
from these studies in various respects. First, our corresponding survey questions are more
specific in that we concentrate only on intertemporal and risk preferences as far as they
relate to retirement preparation. Second, our questionnaire is individually tailored to
each respondent’s personal financial situation. Third, we present results for two different
countries. Given the stark difference in pension institutions between those countries, our
comparison allows for judging our results’ robustness across different institutional settings.
3 The Data
The Dutch CentERpanel. The Dutch CentERpanel (CP) is hosted by the data col-
lection agency CentERdata at Tilburg University, and the data used for the presented
analysis is publicly available from CentERdata. The CP consists of a sample of members
who regularly fill out internet-based questionnaires, typically on weekends. There are two
types of questionnaires. First, panel members are regularly asked about socioeconomic
characteristics of their household within the framework of the so-called DNB Household
Survey. We use this information to tailor our questions to the respondent’s personal finan-
cial situation. Second, panel members are invited to answer special-topic questionnaire
modules such as ours from time to time.
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An outstanding feature of the CP is that it is representative for the overall Dutch
population. Since internet penetration may be systematically lower in some subgroups of
the population, CentERdata provides households that do not own a computer or internet
connection with an add-on device that allows them to access internet via television. It
also provides a television if necessary.
Our questionnaire was conducted in March 2007. We presented the survey to panel
members who were older than 25 and who were either the household’s main breadwinner
or his or her spouse. We also included retired panel members, though some questions were
deliberately only asked to non-retired respondents. Based on these selection criteria, 835
panel members answered our questionnaire. The actual number of responses per question
varies between 590 and 835.
The American Life Panel. The American Life Panel (ALP) at the RAND institu-
tion was modeled after the CP, and grants public access to the data used in this paper. As
in the case of the CP, ALP members regularly answer questions on general socioeconomic
characteristics. The main difference between the ALP and the CP is that the former is
not fully representative of the overall U.S. population. Second, ALP members are not
limited to answering a particular questionnaire during a particular weekend, but typically
may do so during an entire month.
In the case of the ALP, our questionnaire was fielded in November 2007. Using the
same selection criteria as in the case of the CP, 847 panel members answered our ques-
tionnaire. The actual number of responses per question varies between about 600 and
847.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our two samples. The income variable refers
to total household income after taxes. Our measure of gross total wealth includes hous-
ing wealth, but it excludes (financial) retirement savings. In all our analyses, wealth
data enter in the form of wealth quintile dummies. The respondents’ highest degree of
professional education is indicated by the two dummy variables “no vocational training”
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and “university degree”. The excluded category is the middle one, i.e. if both dummy
variables are zero, the corresponding respondent’s highest professional degree is a voca-
tional degree. The variable “children at home” indicates whether any children are living
at the respondent’s home. The figures in Table 1 show that ALP respondents are richer,
wealthier and better educated than the average American.
4 Adequate Old Age Spending in the Absence of Risk
We address the question of what represents an adequate standard of living during retire-
ment from an ex-ante anticipatory perspective. This is the perspective that corresponds
to a preference-based approach which basically underlies all of standard economic theory.
From the ex-ante perspective, the question of what represents an adequate standard of
living during retirement intrinsically relates to two key trade-offs. The first trade-off is
between spending during working life and spending during old age. The second trade-off is
between a safe but lower level of old age spending, and a more risky level of spending with
a higher expected value. The importance of these trade-offs notwithstanding, there may
also be a minimum level of retirement spending below which individuals would not want
to fall even in exchange for very high levels of working life or expected old age spending.6
This discussion highlights the three main topics of our questionnaire, namely the in-
tertemporal trade-off, the risk-return trade-off, and the potential existence of a lower
bound on acceptable old age spending levels. We start our discussion with the intertem-
poral trade-off, since this is the most basic aspect of retirement preparation from an
economist’s point of view.
In the interest of keeping our questionnaire as transparent and simple as possible, our
survey questions on the intertemporal trade-off neglects any form of risk. Furthermore,
6This would, for instance, be the case for habit formation or Stone-Geary type preferences over
intertemporal consumption flows, as well as for the lexicographic loss aversion framework in Binswanger
(2007).
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we do not consider any variation of spending within working life or within retirement.
This would lead to rather difficult questions and, as a consequence, would reduce the
reliability of respondents’ answers. Hence, we concentrate on how average spending levels
during retirement compare to average spending levels during working life.
Specifically, we present each respondent i a total number of six options of monthly
working-life and retirement spending levels
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
, k = 1, 2, . . . , 6. The consumption
levels ckw,i and c
k
r,i represent absolute amounts. Respondents are asked to indicate which
option they like most. The defining property of each option is the ratio ckr,i/c
k
w,i, which we
set at 50, 64, 76, 88, 100, and 140 percent for k = 1, 2, . . . , 6, respectively. This includes
the range of spending ratios that are commonly viewed as potentially adequate. All six
options are characterized by an identical present value of lifetime consumption.
It is important to stress that we show respondents absolute amounts of money, not per-
centages. We do so since respondents may find imagining exactly what these percentage
numbers would mean for their personal situation difficult. We do not inform respondents
that the ratios ckr,i/c
k
w,i correspond to the particular percentage numbers mentioned above.
On a first screen, respondents only see four options corresponding to spending ratios
of 64, 76, 88, and 100 percent, respectively (see Table 2 for an example). This is meant
to avoid respondents having to process an excessive amount of information on one screen.
Only if a respondent chooses a ratio of 64 or 100 percent do we ask on a follow-up screen
if he or she would actually prefer the chosen option to that associated with a ratio of 50
or 140 percent, respectively.
The calculation of the individual spending profiles (ckw,i, c
k
r,i) is outlined in Appendix
A. These profiles are determined according to the following requirements:
(i) All options are tailored to respondents’ income. In particular, the option with the
highest working-life spending level ckw,i on the first screen approximately equals total
household income after taxes.
(ii) The present value of all six presented spending profiles
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
is identical.
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These requirements ensure that all presented options appear realistic to the respon-
dents in light of their personal financial situation. In particular, we rule out that any of
the values of ckw,i on the first screen exceeds the respondent’s current household income
in order to not alienate respondents to whom such options would appear infeasible. All
presented numbers are rounded to entire multiples of 50 or 20 units of the corresponding
currency.7
The introductory text to our spending profile questions is as follows:
Below you find four options of how you could spend your money over your
lifetime. For each option the first column indicates how much your household
could spend on average per month from age 25 until retirement. Thus, this
refers to your total (working) age from age 25 until retirement, not just the
remaining (working) age. The second column indicates how much your house-
hold could spend during retirement. Please think of all your expenditures, such
as food, clothing, accommodation, insurance, traveling etc. Assume that the
numbers below show what you can spend after having already paid for taxes.
Assume also that prices of the things you spend your money on remain the
same in the future as today (no inflation). If you had a choice, which option
would you like most? 8
Table 2 shows an example of a table with the actual options appearing below the above
introductory text.9 The numbers correspond to a monthly household income after taxes
7We should also point out that the assumptions made for calculating the profiles
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
do not
imply any assumptions about actual savings behavior of respondents. Our goal is only to show respondents
feasible spending profiles in order to learn which of the profiles they would like most. Note further that
our analysis neglects both a bequest motive and health expenditure shocks during retirement. We do so
for two related reasons. First, it is of interest to know what spending profiles individuals prefer in the
absence of other perturbing factors. Second, bringing bequests and unexpected health shocks into play
would make our survey questions much more demanding.
8For single households the text is adapted accordingly. If a respondent was retired, then we added as
a first sentence to the above text: Please suppose for a moment that you were not yet retired.
9The numbers in the first column are meant to refer to the average monthly spending levels during
the entire working life. If respondents were not able to understand this, then households at ages closer
to retirement would find it in their interest to choose steeper consumption profiles. As we will outline
below, we do not find any evidence for this to happen.
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of 3,000 U.S. dollars. Table 2 refers to an interest rate of one percent.10 After having indi-
cated their favorite profile, respondents are presented with a second table, corresponding
to an interest rate of six percent. In this second table, the ratios of the spending levels
are identical. However, for a higher interest rate, achieving a given level of retirement
spending requires giving up less working-life spending. As a result, the distances between
the numbers in the first column are smaller and the distances in the second column are
larger.
It is important to stress that a respondent choosing her most-preferred profile
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
from Table 2 need not have an understanding of compound interest rate calculations,
inflation or any other technical detail. Our inference based on respondents’ answers only
depends on the assumption that individuals have well-defined preferences over spending
profiles such as shown in Table 2. The assumption that individuals have well-defined
preferences is much weaker than the assumption that individuals are able to make utility
maximizing choices. People may well know what spending profile they would like to
achieve, but they may not be able to implement it, due to, e.g., financial illiteracy.
The results are shown in Table 3. We find that the distribution of chosen spending
ratios for non-retirees (see upper panel) does not differ from the distribution for retirees
(see lower panel) for both the ALP and the CP.11 The key observations are the following.
First, irrespective of the sample and the level of the interest rate, only very few respondents
preferred a spending profile corresponding to a ratio of 50 or 64 percent. Second, there is
substantial mass concentrated on the options corresponding to spending ratios of 76, 88,
and 100 percent. Third, the 140 percent option is very popular in the U.S., but not in the
Netherlands, at an interest rate of one percent. Finally, consistent with economic theory,
the 140 percent option is much more popular for an interest rate of six percent than for
an interest rate of one percent in both countries.
The differences in the distributions of preferred spending ratios between the U.S. and
10See the appendix for how ckw,i and c
k
r,i depend on the interest rate.
11Based on Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, equality of distributions cannot be rejected.
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the Dutch sample are statistically significant.12 This mainly reflects the fact that the 140
percent option is much more popular in the U.S. Two explanations may be put forward
for this fact. First, U.S. respondents may expect to face higher out-of-pocket costs for
medical treatments and nursing homes (see footnote 18 below). Second, Americans may
find postponing consumption until retirement as a complement to leisure more desirable.
This is consistent with the fact that the number of vacation days is typically much lower
in the U.S. than in the Netherlands.13 As a result, people working in the U.S. may find
delaying spending power until retirement – when they have the time to enjoy leisure –
preferable.
Based on our data, we have no means for investigating the second explanation. How-
ever, our survey allows us to shed some light on the first one. If respondents who choose
an increasing spending profile did so in anticipation of high out-of-pocket medical costs,
we should also expect these respondents to indicate a systematically higher level of min-
imum old age spending. Since our survey also contains a question on such a minimum
level of old age spending (see Section 5.1), we can test this hypothesis. We do not find
that respondents that choose a spending ratio of 140 percent indicate a systematically
higher minimum old age spending level. Thus, we conclude that the preference for a steep
spending profile is unlikely to reflect the anticipation of high health expenditures.
An interesting question is whether the choice of a particular spending profile systemat-
ically relates to respondents’ socioeconomic characteristics. We explore this by regressing
respondents’ choices on a range of explanatory variables including income and wealth
quintiles, an age polynomial, as well as all other general household characteristics. In
both samples, an F-test for joint significance of all explanatory variables is insignificant,
indicating that the explanatory variables do not have a systematic effect on respondents’
choices.14 We conclude that the heterogeneity of respondents’ answers reflects, to a major
12Based on a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, equality is rejected at the 1-percent significance level.
13In 2005, the number of annual hours worked per worker amounted to about 1,900 in the U.S. and
about 1,400 in the Netherlands (OECD, 2008).
14The corresponding estimation results from ordered logit regressions are reported in Appendix B,
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extent, pure preference heterogeneity, not heterogeneity with respect to socioeconomic
characteristics.
One concern with our questions on preferred spending profiles may be whether respon-
dents really understand that the spending levels associated with working life refer to the
entire working life, not just to their remaining working life. If not, then older respondents
may find it desirable to choose a profile with a high spending ratio. This would then
imply that age is significantly related to respondents’ choices. Regardless of the order of
the age polynomial that we include in our regressions, the included age variables are nei-
ther jointly nor individually significant. This leads us to the conclusion that respondents
clearly were able to understand that the numbers ckw,i were meant to refer to the entire
working life, not just to the remaining working life. This also provides general evidence
that respondents were able to cope with our questions.
In order to explore whether respondents indicate choices that relate to their true pref-
erences, we randomized the order of the response options. Respondents were randomly
assigned to one of two treatments. Half of the respondents saw the numbers arranged in
the order as in Table 2, where the order of the spending ratios is decreasing. The other
half saw the numbers arranged with an increasing order of spending ratios. In order to
investigate the effects of these randomization treatments, we include a dummy variable
indicating the order in which the response options are arranged in the regressions for
preferred spending ratios discussed above. The resulting coefficients of the randomization
dummy are always insignificant and very small. Furthermore, the inclusion of the dummy
does not change the coefficients of the other included variables. As an additional formal
test of the answer quality, we estimate models that are fully interacted with the ran-
domization dummy. The corresponding F-tests for the joint significance of all interaction
terms are insignificant for both the CP and the ALP.
To further explore the quality of the respondents’ answers, we make use of three vari-
Table B.1. Ordered probit or OLS regressions yield very similar results.
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ables which we treat as measures of the degree to which respondents provide “informed”
answers. At the end of our questionnaire we ask respondents to indicate whether or not
they agree with the following statements:15
1. Many questions didn’t make sense to me.
2. Many questions were too abstract for me.
3. I find it very difficult to imagine how much money I would want to have during
retirement.
Respondents may check either of the options (1) fully disagree, (2) somewhat disagree,
(3) somewhat agree, (4) fully agree. The percentage of respondents who either fully or
somewhat disagree amounts to 71, 62, and 75 percent for the three statements, respec-
tively, for the ALP. For the CP the corresponding numbers are 58, 45, and 18 percent,
respectively.16 We use the answers to the above question to group respondents into an
“informed” and a “less informed” subgroup. As before, whatever tests we run, we find
that being a member of the informed group never affects response behavior in any signif-
icant way, i.e. the coefficients on dummy variables indicating informed respondents are
insignificant in all regressions that we consider. We view this as an indication that even
respondents who feel somewhat less at ease with our questions provide us with meaningful
answers.
The main conclusion drawn from the results discussed in this section is that a substan-
tial fraction of the population prefers spending ratios that exceed 80 percent of working
15It has been observed that respondents sometimes show a tendency to agree when asked to rate a
particular statement (Clark and Schober, 1992). To set bars high, we therefore ask respondents whether
our questions did not make sense to them. Moreover, we also randomized the ordering of the four answer
categories of these questions, and we did not find any significant impact on response behavior based on
the corresponding Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for distributional differences.
16The reason that most likely explains why ALP respondents have a clearer idea of the standard of
living during retirement that they envisage is that institutions in the U.S. require individuals to take
much more own responsibility for their retirement preparation. This may induce people to think more
carefully about their retirement needs. In the Netherlands, a typical worker belongs to a mandatory
defined benefit scheme that typically offers an after-tax replacement rate of above 80 percent.
15
life spending. This applies to both the Netherlands and the U.S. In the case that old age
spending is exposed to risk, our finding would apply to certainty equivalence values of old
age spending.
5 Bringing Risk into Play
We consider risk from two different perspectives. First, we conceptualize risk from the
perspective of a lower limit on old age spending below which an individual would not want
to fall in almost any case. This represents a particularly simple framework for thinking
about risk since it does not require evaluating any risk-return trade-off. Such a framework
corresponds to the logic of poverty thresholds as well as to preferences with habit formation
or Stone-Geary utility functions.17 Information on such a minimum acceptable level of
old age spending is very useful for thinking about adequate retirement preparation. It
specifies a benchmark spending level that an individual may want to exceed, from an
ex-ante point of view, with a very high probability. Thus, such a benchmark helps to
identify adequate asset allocation strategies for individual retirement accounts. It also
implies an overall lower bound on adequate savings for retirement.
Second, we are interested in how respondents evaluate potential risk-return trade-
offs. We therefore also include a standard set of questions in our survey for identifying
coefficients of relative risk aversion. The innovation here is that we elicit this parameter
strictly in the context of retirement preparation and that the options respondents may
choose between are again tailored to their personal financial situation.
We start with the analysis of lower bounds on old age spending.
5.1 Lower Limits on Adequate Old Age Spending
We present respondents the following question.
17See Binswanger (2007).
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This question refers to the overall level of spending that applies to you and
your partner during retirement. What is a minimal level of monthly spending
that you never want to fall below during retirement, at all costs? Please think
of all your expenditures, such as food, clothing, accommodation, insurance etc.
Assume that prices of the things you spend your money on remain the same
in the future as today (no inflation).
The question is framed in a way that we should expect answers to differ across different
countries if they are characterized by different institutions. For instance, the answers to
this question may differ between countries with different health insurance schemes.18
For the ALP, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile of the answers amount to 2,000,
3,000, and 4,000 year-2007 U.S. dollars per month, respectively. The 25th, 50th and
75th percentiles of the ratio of the answers to total monthly household income after taxes
amount to .48, .73, and .95, respectively. For the CP, the respective absolute numbers are
1,200, 1,600, and 2,000 year-2007 euros per month. The respective ratios of the answers
to total household income after taxes are .56, .72, and .88.
Table 4 shows median regressions with the answers to the above question as the de-
pendent variable.19 Our estimation results show that income primarily determines the
minimally acceptable spending level.20 In particular, minimum spending levels neither
depend in a statistically significant way on age, regardless of the order of the age poly-
nomial, nor on whether children live at home. These latter results mean that neither the
18In contrast to the U.S., health insurance is compulsory for everyone in the Netherlands and pays for
most doctor visits and pharmaceuticals as well as for hospital stays up to one year. Furthermore, every
resident is covered by a public long-term care insurance scheme (dubbed AWBZ) that covers nursing
homes and long-term hospital stays. The U.S. Medicare system requires a 20 percent copayment for
hospital stays, a feature that has no counterpart in the Netherlands. Covering this copayment requires an
extra (non-mandatory) so-called Medigap insurance. (The requirement of a copayment drops if Medicaid
covers care costs.)
19Given the skewness of the data, we use median regressions, since a median regression is a more robust
estimation method than OLS.
20For the ALP, the dummy variables indicating income quintiles do not refer to the quintiles according
to our sample but according to the Current Population Survey. Since the ALP is not representative for
the U.S. population, this makes it easier to interpret the results. For the CP, the quintiles refer to our
sample.
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current family situation nor the current age systematically affects the way respondents
anticipate their retirement needs. This is exactly what we should expect if respondents
rationally anticipate their retirement needs. We view the fact that we actually do observe
this pattern as an indication of the quality of our responses.
Interestingly, retired respondents are significantly more conservative with respect to
their minimum needs in the Netherlands. In contrast, respondents with a university
degree are less conservative. It is noteworthy that the regression results in Table 4 are
robust across many different specifications that we have estimated.
The regression results in Table 4 allow for calibrating minimum acceptable spending
levels for any combination of household characteristics we may be interested in. Since our
results show income to be clearly the most important determinant for minimum spending
levels, we calibrate such spending levels for each income quintile. We do so for a non-
single household aged 60 that is not retired.21 Furthermore, we set the values of the
dummy variables for children, home ownership, no vocational training, and for having
a university degree to zero. Concerning wealth, we assign to each income quintile that
particular wealth quintile to which the median member of a particular income quintile
belongs to.
The results for these calibrations are shown in Table 5. The upper panel refers to the
ALP and the measurement units are year-2007 U.S. dollars. The lower panel refers to the
CP and the units are year-2007 euros. The first column in each of the two panels shows
the calibrated monthly minimum spending levels. The second column simply reports the
monthly median after-tax incomes in our samples for each income quintile. The striking
pattern in Table 5 is that the increments in minimum spending levels are smaller than
the increments in income. This pattern is particularly pronounced for the U.S., which
is reflected in the decreasing ratios of spending levels to incomes, as shown in the third
column of Table 5. In the U.S., the minimum spending-to-income ratio is even slightly
21Almost identical results are obtained for ages of 40 or 50.
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higher than one for the first quintile. This suggests that households in our lowest income
quintile have serious problems making ends meet. This is substantiated by the fact that
the median monthly income of households in our first income quintile (see Table 5) is
already well below the poverty threshold in the U.S. which is 1,129 U.S. dollars per
month for two-person households and 1,378 U.S. dollars for three-person households.22
For all other quintiles in case of the U.S., and for all quintiles in the Netherlands,
the calibrated replacement rates are below one. This suggests that people anticipate that
they would be able to cut back if necessary. This result is consistent with the recent
finding of Aguiar and Hurst (2007) that the elderly spend less money for a given amount
of “consumption intake”.
What do we further learn from Table 5? Our calibrations are useful in two further
respects. First, they prove helpful in designing adequate asset allocation strategies, since
any asset allocation strategy maps into a distribution of available resources during retire-
ment. Our calibrations help identify adequate portfolio strategies in that, say, the 90th
percentile of the resulting distribution of monthly spending should exceed the values in
the first column of Table 5. Second, the numbers in Table 5 may be useful for thinking
about adequate benefit levels in a mandatory pension system.
As in the case of spending profiles discussed in the last section, we conclude this sec-
tion with the investigation of whether we can judge respondents’ answers as informed and
reliable. As described in Section 4, we therefore classify respondents into an informed and
a less informed subgroup. Once again, we find no significant difference in response behav-
ior between either subgroup. This holds for all three information measures. In particular,
if dummy variables indicating the less informed subgroup are added as explanatory vari-
ables in the regressions reported in Table 4, they are never significant, they do not have
any effect on the coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables, and interaction terms
are jointly insignificant in both ALP and CP.
22These poverty thresholds refer to the year 2007 and are provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, see:
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld/thresh07.html.
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5.2 Relative Risk Aversion
Our final question elicits the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We employ the widely-
used multiple price list design of Holt and Laury (2002). Specifically, respondents are
presented with the following question.
In the following table we present five choices to you. You can always choose
between two different types of income during retirement, income of type A
and of type B. Please assume that these incomes include all sources of money
available to you during retirement. In particular, there is no additional money
available from spending down your wealth. If you choose income type A, the
total income during retirement for you and your partner will always be [Zsi ]
per month, independent of the performance of the economy. If you choose
type B, the total income during retirement for you and your partner depends
on the performance of the economy (e.g. on returns in financial markets).
If the economic performance is unfavorable it will be [Zrli ] per month. If the
performance is favorable it will be [Zrhi ] per month. The five choices differ only
in terms of the chance that the favorable or unfavorable economic performance
will materialize. Which income type would you choose?
A: [Zsi ] Euros, or
B: [1− pi] percent chance of [Zrli ], and [pi] percent chance of [Z
rh
i ].
(. . .)
The probability pi is set to 50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 percent for the five choice situations,
respectively. We set Zsi to 85 percent of a respondent’s current monthly income, Z
rl
i
to 70 and Zrhi to 100 percent of her current monthly income. However, it is important
to stress that, as in the case of risk-free spending ratios in Section 4, respondents see
absolute money values and are not made aware that these values correspond to particular
replacement rates. All values are again rounded to entire multiples of 50 or 20 units of
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the corresponding currency, depending on their magnitude.
Under CRRA preferences, expected utility of a random prospect x˜ is defined as
U (x˜) = E
[
1
1− θ
x˜1−θ
]
,
where θ denotes the parameter of relative risk aversion and E the mathematical expec-
tation operator. We identify the value of θ for each respondent by using information
on her switching point. Specifically, respondents indicate whether they would prefer the
safe option (A) or the risky option (B) when the probability for the high realization as-
sociated with the risky option amounts to 50, 60, 70, 80, or 90 percent, respectively.
If, for instance, a respondent prefers the safe option in the case of 60 percent and the
risky option in case of 70 percent, his switch point is given by the 70-percent prospect.
We then know that 1/ (1− θ) (Zsi )
1−θ
≥ 0.4/ (1− θ)
(
Zrli
)1−θ
+ 0.6/ (1− θ)
(
Zrhi
)1−θ
but
1/ (1− θ) (Zsi )
1−θ
≤ 0.3/ (1− θ)
(
Zrli
)1−θ
+ 0.7/ (1− θ)
(
Zrhi
)1−θ
. This allows us to iden-
tify the highest value of θ that is consistent with the respondent’s switching point.23
For the ALP, the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the observed distribution of θ
are 2, 4 and 7, respectively. For the CP they amount to 4, 7, and 12. Figures 1 and 2
show estimated kernel densities for both samples.24 Clearly, the Dutch respondents are
far more risk averse than the U.S. respondents. However, Figures 1 and 2 show that
there is also considerable heterogeneity within each country. This is an important result
for calibration studies aiming to identify optimal retirement saving and asset allocation
strategies as well as an optimal design of a mandatory pension system. It indicates the
importance of taking individual preference heterogeneity into account.25
23Identical with Holt and Laury (2002), we use the (last) point where a subject switches from option A
to option B. The vast majority of our respondents (95 percent for the CP, and 94 percent for the ALP)
only switches once. As in Holt and Laury (2002), we find that the analysis reported here does not change
if we drop respondents who switch from B back to A.
24An Epanechnikov kernel and Silverman’s rule of thumb (Silverman, 1986) for bandwidth selection
have been used for the kernel density estimation.
25It is of interest to compare our elicited values of relative risk aversion in the domain of retirement
preparation to the results obtained by Barsky et al. (1997) for the case of “lotteries” over jobs. The
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We are again interested in the question whether socioeconomic background character-
istics are systematically related to respondents’ risk aversion. To explore this question,
we regress the the coefficient of relative risk aversion on the usual income and wealth
quintiles as well as all explanatory variables shown in Table 1. Neither in the ALP nor in
the CP do we identify any systematic relationship between the explanatory variables and
relative risk aversion.26
The fact that CP respondents are substantially more risk averse than ALP respondents
may have several explanations. First, it may reflect that the ALP is less representative
for the general population than the CP. Second, institutions may be such that they are
more likely to favor risk-taking in the U.S. Third, the effect may be cultural. Since
ALP respondents are wealthier and better educated than the average American, the first
explanation would require that income, wealth, or education be positively associated
with measured relative risk aversion. However, we do not find any such statistically
significant associations. The second explanation would entail the U.S. social insurance
system covering more risks than its Dutch counterpart. This is clearly not the case. This
renders the third explanation the most likely one.
As before, we also investigate response quality. First, the order of the response options
was randomized. If we include a dummy variable indicating the randomization treatment
in the regressions shown in Table B.2, this dummy is always insignificant and its inclu-
sion does not change the coefficients of the other regressors. This result holds for other
specifications, e.g. specifications with only subsets of the socioeconomic variables. We
also estimate models where the randomization dummy is fully interacted with all other
explanatory variables. Further underlining our observation that the order of response
options does not play a role, an F-test on joint significance of all interaction terms is in-
significant for the ALP. The F-test is significant for the CP, but the significance vanishes
25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of the distribution for relative risk aversion in their sample are 4, 7, and
14, respectively. (See their footnote 18 on p. 548.)
26The corresponding estimation results are reported in Appendix B, Table B.2. F-tests, reported in
the table, confirm that all explanatory variables are jointly insignificant.
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as soon as we stratify the sample by retirement status. Second, we investigate whether
the degree to which respondents feel informed (which we elicited based on three ques-
tions asked at the end of the survey, see Section 4) systematically affects respondent’s
answers. Fully in line with all our previously reported results, we do not find any such
evidence. Dummies indicating informed respondents are always insignificant and their
inclusion does not affect the coefficients of the other regressors.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we use a specifically designed internet survey conducted in the U.S. and the
Netherlands to address the question of what represents an adequate standard of living
during old age. We address this question from an ex-ante point of view, consistent with
the perspective suggested by economic theory. A series of randomization treatments as
well as various feedback questions show that there is little reason to doubt that respon-
dents’ answers to our questionnaire are meaningful. Our findings further indicate that
respondents are able to look beyond their current household situation when answering
our questions about an adequate standard of living during retirement. Overall, people
seem to have a fairly good idea of the level of old age spending that they find desirable.
We find that the large majority of individuals aim to achieve a spending profile where,
under normal circumstances, old age spending exceeds 80 percent of working-life spend-
ing. Bringing risk into play, there is clear evidence that individuals do not want to fall
below a certain lower limit of old age spending. We use respondents’ answers to calibrate
minimum income replacement rates for each income quintile. For the U.S. sample, these
range between 100 percent for the lowest quintile and 50 percent for the highest. For the
Netherlands, the corresponding numbers are 70 and 60 percent, respectively. Turning to
the question how respondents evaluate risk-return trade-offs, we find considerable hetero-
geneity within and between samples. In particular, risk aversion is much higher in the
23
Dutch than in the U.S. sample.
Our results may help identify a benchmark of adequate old age spending levels. In this
respect, we view our results about minimally acceptable spending levels as particularly
helpful. They can be used directly to infer critical lower bounds on wealth accumulation.
Furthermore, we may infer optimal contribution and benefit levels for a mandatory pension
system. Allowing individuals to reach the minimally acceptable spending levels identified
in this paper would be a natural way of determining benefit levels. Binswanger (2007)
provides a simple framework that may prove useful for analyzing how to achieve this by
combining a funded with a pay-as-you-go pension component.
In future research, our approach using an individually tailored and randomized survey
design for eliciting information on preferences can be applied in various other domains
that are important for policy. For example, consider information on individual prefer-
ences with respect to the trade-off between lower contributions to the welfare state and
higher levels of risk borne by private individuals. Such information is relevant for the
identification of a desirable design of social policy as well as of desirable macroeconomic
policies. Carefully elicited information on people’s preferences will stimulate the interac-
tion between theoretical and empirical researchers, will make the policy discourse richer,
and may ultimately lead to better policies.
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Figure 1: The distribution of relative risk aversion for the U.S.
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Figure 2: The distribution of relative risk aversion for the Netherlands
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
ALP CP
Mean Median Standard deviation Mean Median Standard deviation
Age 51.04 52 14.29 50.40 51 16.10
Income 5,000 4,521 6,001 2,419 2,250 1,612
Total gross wealth 507,409 345,113 632,613 228,756 206,725 228,138
Single 0.21 0 0.41 0.21 0 0.40
Children at home 0.25 0 0.44 0.36 0 0.48
Home ownership 0.80 1 0.40 0.71 1 0.45
Retired 0.27 0 0.44 0.22 0 0.41
No vocational training 0.17 0 0.38 0.31 0 0.46
University degree 0.47 0 0.50 0.11 0 0.31
Note: Total number of respondents is 847 for the ALP and 835 for the CP. Income and wealth is measured in year-2007
U.S. dollars for the ALP and in year-2007 euros for the CP.
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Table 2: Options of expenditures profiles (example)
Monthly spending during working life (age
25 until retirement) in U.S. dollars
Monthly spending during
retirement in U.S. dollars
Option A 2,650 2,650
Option B 2,750 2,400
Option C 2,850 2,150
Option D 2,950 1,900
Note: The numbers refer to an income of 3,000 U.S. dollars.
Table 3: Distribution of preferred spending ratios for non-retirees and retirees
Panel A: Non-retirees
ALP CP
Spending ratio Interest rate of Interest rate of
1 percent 6 percent 1 percent 6 percent
50 percent 5 7 4 7
64 percent 11 6 5 4
76 percent 16 13 23 14
88 percent 24 22 36 33
100 percent 17 11 23 22
140 percent 25 41 8 20
Panel B: Retirees
ALP CP
Spending ratio Interest rate of Interest rate of
1 percent 6 percent 1 percent 6 percent
50 percent 7 8 2 2
64 percent 9 10 9 3
76 percent 18 16 19 14
88 percent 25 19 34 35
100 percent 20 13 28 26
140 percent 20 34 7 19
Note: The numbers indicate percentages of observations. The total
number of non-retirees are 576 for the ALP and 539 for the CP. The
total number of retirees are 211 for the ALP and 169 for the CP.
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Table 4: Median regressions for minimum acceptable old age spending levels
ALP CP
Income quintile 2 878.67∗∗ 414.63∗∗
(203.89) (82.26)
Income quintile 3 1449.66∗∗ 612.12∗∗
(204.65) (87.19)
Income quintile 4 2015.86∗∗ 940.46∗∗
(208.34) (92.38)
Income quintile 5 3019.13∗∗ 1429.97∗∗
(253.66) (96.66)
Wealth quintile 2 -22.05 -80.74
(218.98) (79.36)
Wealth quintile 3 168.12 -38.88
(229.08) (88.44)
Wealth quintile 4 220.26 -11.50
(243.82) (85.99)
Wealth quintile 5 720.28∗∗ -0.74
(254.93) (93.15)
Age 32.67 1.70
(23.70) (12.03)
Age2 / 100 -26.03 -2.24
(24.64) (12.08)
Single -261.19 52.49
(138.81) (77.81)
Children at home 81.64 -0.72
(133.80) (67.97)
Home ownership -48.93 39.65
(186.92) (66.71)
Retired 246.59 201.34∗
(174.40) (91.41)
No vocational training -181.52 -43.40
(171.31) (62.99)
University degree 167.11 -181.97∗
(121.54) (83.07)
Constant 120.93 999.82∗∗
(548.30) (296.99)
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.27
Number of observations 591 576
Note: The dependent variable is measured in year-
2007 U.S. dollars for the ALP and in year-2007
euros for the CP. One and two asterisks denote
significance at the five and one percent level, re-
spectively. Robust standard errors are indicated in
parentheses.
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Table 5: Minimum acceptable old age spending levels and minimum replacement rates
ALP
Minimum spending Median income Ratio
Quintile 1 1,144 1,058 1.08
Quintile 2 2,002 2,344 0.85
Quintile 3 2,762 3,215 0.86
Quintile 4 3,377 6,384 0.53
Quintile 5 4,884 9,054 0.54
CP
Minimum spending Median income Ratio
Quintile 1 951 1,359 0.69
Quintile 2 1,327 1,835 0.72
Quintile 3 1,525 2,300 0.66
Quintile 4 1,852 2,875 0.64
Quintile 5 2,370 3,765 0.63
Note: Minimum spending levels per month are calculated
setting age to 60. In case of the ALP, income quintiles re-
fer to the Current Population Survey, not the ALP itself.
Numbers in the upper panel represent year-2007 U.S. dol-
lars. Numbers in the lower panel represent year-2007 euros.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Spending Profiles of Sec-
tion 4
We discuss here the calculation of the spending profiles
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
that underly the anal-
ysis in Section 4. For the derivation of these profiles we make a number of simplifying
assumptions. A respondent’s working life is assumed to start at the age of 25. Further-
more, we assume that respondents retire at age 65 in case of the ALP and at 61 in case
of the CP.27 We neglect mortality risk and assume that death occurs with certainty after
age 85.28
The present value of the profile
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
for respondent i is then given by
R−1∑
t=25
(
1
1 + r
)t−25
12 ckw,i +
85∑
t=R
(
1
1 + r
)t−25
12 ckr,i = PV Yi.
R denotes the retirement age and amounts to either 65 or 61. r denotes the real risk-free
interest rate. (Respondents are first asked to choose their favorite spending profile for an
interest rate of one percent and then for an interest rate of six percent.) PV Yi denotes a
hypothetical present value of lifetime income for respondent i. It is determined according
to
PV Yi =
R−1∑
t=25
(
1
1 + r
)t−25
0.98 Yi +
85∑
t=R
(
1
1 + r
)t−25
0.64 (0.98 Yi) . (1)
Yi represents respondent i’s total annual household income after taxes and after deduction
of contributions to existing mandatory pension systems. We do observe Yi from previous
survey modules.
27In the U.S., Social Security benefits can be claimed beginning at age 62. The normal retirement age
varies between 65 and 67 depending on the year of birth. In the Netherlands, first-pillar benefits can be
claimed from the age of 60 on, while the normal retirement age is 65. Effective retirement ages are 64
and 61 for the U.S. and the Netherlands, respectively (OECD, 2006).
28According to the 2008 OASDI Trustees Report (OASDI, 2008), life expectancy at age 65 currently
amounts to 81.7 for men and 84.2 for women. It is expected to increase to 84.3 for men and to 86.4 for
women in 2050.
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Two features of (1) require explanation. First, we use 98 Yi instead of Yi for the
calculation of the hypothetical present value of income. This is done to assure that the
number corresponding to the highest ckw,i on the first screen does not exceed Yi even after
rounding (which may mean upward rounding). Second, we need to explain the presence
of the number 0.64. Our calculation of PV Yi implicitly assumes that retirement income
equals 64 percent of working-life income. This assumption is hypothetical. It implies that
if ckw,i is equal to current income, then c
k
r,i/c
k
w,i is equal to 0.64. This is thus the case for
the option with the highest ckw,i on the first screen, where c
k
w,i is approximately equal to Yi.
Our implicit reasoning behind this is that the observed income Yi is net of contributions
to currently existing mandatory pension systems. These contributions may be sufficient
to achieve an income replacement rate of 64 percent in a fully-funded pension system.29
We should point out that the assumptions made for calculating the profiles
(
ckw,i, c
k
r,i
)
do not imply any assumptions about actual savings behavior of respondents. Our pur-
pose is uniquely to show respondents spending profiles that are feasible under the above
assumptions in order to learn which of the feasible profiles they would like most.
29The average current U.S. Social Security replacement rate is only around 40 percent due to the
very low implicit returns of the Social Security system. When fully phased in, a fully-funded system
would allow to finance much higher replacement rates (see Feldstein and Ranguelova, 2001). The Dutch
mandatory pension system depends heavily on a funded component. A typical income replacement rate
after taxes for a full employment history is 85 percent. We suspect that this number will decrease due to
aging and increases in longevity.
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Appendix B: Supplementary Tables
Table B.1: Ordered logit regressions for spending ratios
ALP CP
Income quintile 2 0.36 -0.22
(0.26) (0.26)
Income quintile 3 -0.11 -0.02
(0.25) (0.27)
Income quintile 4 -0.00 -0.18
(0.26) (0.30)
Income quintile 5 -0.66* -0.06
(0.32) (0.31)
Wealth quintile 2 0.00 0.04
(0.30) (0.22)
Wealth quintile 3 0.06 0.13
(0.28) (0.25)
Wealth quintile 4 0.13 0.54
(0.30) (0.28)
Wealth quintile 5 0.17 -0.00
(0.31) (0.26)
Age -0.05 -0.23
(0.12) (0.19)
Age2 / 100 0.16 0.41
(0.25) (0.37)
Age3 / 10000 -0.15 -0.23
(0.16) (0.23)
Single -0.02 -0.12
(0.18) (0.24)
Children at home 0.04 -0.48*
(0.18) (0.22)
Home ownership -0.09 -0.25
(0.27) (0.20)
Retired 0.07 0.18
(0.22) (0.28)
No vocational training 0.04 0.04
(0.20) (0.18)
University degree 0.05 -0.37
(0.15) (0.23)
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.01
F-test joint sign. expl. vars 0.12 0.10
Observations 787 634
Note: One and two asterisks denote significance at the
five and one percent level, respectively. Robust standard
errors are indicated in parentheses. Very similar results
are obtained if we use ordered probit or OLS models.
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Table B.2: OLS regressions for coefficient of relative risk aversion
ALP CP
Income quintile 2 0.34 0.32
(0.66) (0.59)
Income quintile 3 0.10 1.07
(0.64) (0.62)
Income quintile 4 -0.95 1.01
(0.65) (0.66)
Income quintile 5 -1.01 -0.25
(0.74) (0.70)
Wealth quintile 2 0.11 -0.88
(0.69) (0.60)
Wealth quintile 3 0.33 0.30
(0.72) (0.58)
Wealth quintile 4 -0.37 0.15
(0.78) (0.60)
Wealth quintile 5 -0.16 0.19
(0.83) (0.70)
Age -0.02 0.02
(0.07) (0.09)
Age2 / 100 0.02 0.00
(0.08) (0.09)
Single -0.89 0.62
(0.46) (0.58)
Children at home 0.17 -0.46
(0.38) (0.47)
Home ownership 0.31 -0.87
(0.62) (0.48)
Retired 0.12 -0.99
(0.57) (0.71)
No vocational training -0.82 -0.29
(0.51) (0.46)
University degree -0.04 -1.10
(0.38) (0.60)
Constant 5.64** 7.21**
(1.65) (2.08)
R2 0.03 0.04
F-test joint sign. expl. vars 0.28 0.12
Observations 680 538
Note: One and two asterisks denote significance at the
five and one percent level, respectively. Robust standard
errors are indicated in parentheses.
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